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ARGUMENT 
Point 1: Larsen's Agreement to The Stipulated Order Does Not 
Preclude Medical Reimbursement From the Employer's 
Reinsurance Fund Under Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-69 
The Employer's Reinsurance Fund argues that the Commission 
properly refused to allow reimbursement of medical benefits under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-69 based upon a plain reading of the Stipulation and 
Order of Tentative Permanent Total Disability which it submits is an 
"unambiguous" contract. We believe that its argument lacks substantive 
merit. l 
The Employer's Reinsurance Fund argues that the Stipulation and 
Order of Tentative Permanent Total Disability is a contract and, is not 
ambiguous. As such, ERF argues that as an unambiguous contract, the 
parties intentions are governed by the plain meaning of the contractual 
language which, it believes, requires Globe / Larsen to pay 100% of the 
medical benefits on a permanent basis, without reimbursement from the 
ERF which would otherwise be permitted under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
1
 The ERF is correct that ALJ LaJeunesse was the presiding judge at 
the January, 2007 hearing. Larson Beverage / Globe Indemnity stands 
corrected on that point. What is striking about this, is that Judge 
LaJeunesse indicated at the hearing that he was going to issue an order 
allowing reimbursement of medical expenses i and indemnity benefits. 
However, his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lgiw and Order are directly 
contrary to his express statements and bench niling. 
1 
69. We disagree and submit that there are several flaws in the ERF's 
analysis. 
It is first debatable whether, under Utah law, the Utah Labor 
Commission has the authority to interpret a contract. Some Utah 
courts hold that the Commission is of limited jurisdiction and, as an 
administrative tribunal, has no authority to interpret contracts. See 
State Compensation Ins. Fund of Colorado v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 657 P.2d 761 (Utah 1983). More recently, however, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has opined that the Labor Commission has authority to 
interpret contracts, including, for instance the claims released in a 
Compromise Settlement Agreement. See Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 
748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). For instance, in Wilburn, the Court 
of Appeals was asked to evaluate whether a Compromise Settlement 
Agreement released a worker's claim for permanent total disability. The 
appellate court held that since the agreement was ambiguous the ALJ 
appropriately held a hearing and considered extrinsic evidence, including 
testimony of legal counsel, plaintiffs own testimony, and other testimony 
in an effort to find the intentions of the parties in entering into the 
agreement. See id., at 585. 
Assuming that the ALJ and Commission, 8LS the ultimate fact 
finder, had the authority to interpret the Stipulation and Order of 
2 
Tentative Permanent Total Disability, the ERF is incorrect in arguing that 
the agreement is unambiguous and that the court properly refused to 
allow extrinsic evidence to interpret this agreement. Under Utah law, a 
court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions where a 
contractual provision is ambiguous. See Peterson v. Coca Cola United 
States, 2002 UT 42; See Wilburn v. Interstate Elfectric, 748 P.2d 582 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Peterson, the Court held that: "A contract 
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings qf terms, missing terms, 
or other facial deficiencies.'" Id. The Utah Supreme Court has recently 
held that "[a] contractual term is ambiguous if, iboking to the language of 
the contract alone, it is reasonably capable of bding understood in more 
than one way such that there are tenable positions on both sides." See 
Deer Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, P13 (Utah 
2008); Krauss v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) 
Viewed in the context of these principles, i|t is abundantly clear that 
the four corners and intent rules are not mutually exclusive and that 
there are tenable positions on both sides. The $tipulation and Order of 
Tentative Permanent Total Disability is "ambiguous" with regard to the 
duration of the payment of medical expenses by Larson /Globe and 
3 
whether the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 applied to allow 
Larson /Globe to obtain ERF reimbursement of medical and indemnity 
compensation. The four corners of the document are insufficient to 
resolve this issue. Consider the following provisions in the agreement 
which give rise to this ambiguity: 
(1) the caption of the Stipulation indicates it is a "Tentative" 
agreement, meaning the terms are not permanent. 
(2) the Stipulation section of the agreement indicates that 
Larson/Globe is responsible for "all medical expenses resulting 
from the industrial accident of August 23, 1993 subject to the Fee 
Schedule of the Labor Commission"; and, 
(3) the Stipulation Order section of the document is completely 
silent as to any obligation of Larson / Globe regarding medical 
expenses and is also silent whether the agreement is tentative or 
permanent. 
Unfortunately, these provisions, when read collectively lead to some 
uncertainty regarding the duration of the payment of medical expenses 
and whether reimbursement of medical and even indemnity benefits 
would be permitted under Utah law. On this basis, this Court should 
find that the Stipulation and Order of Tentative Permanent Total 
Disability is ambiguous and remand to the administrative law judge to 
4 
allow for submiss ion of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of 
the agreement . 2 
Even if the ERF is correct, tha t the t e rms off the stipulation are not 
ambiguous , t h u s precluding submission of extrinjsic evidence, the plain 
language of the st ipulation indicates tha t the agreement was one of a 
tentat ive na tu re . The meaning of the term tentative m e a n s conditional 
or non-final. By sua sponte reforming the contract into a pe rmanen t or 
"final" agreement, the ALJ and Commission acted outside their authority 
2
 Assuming that the Stipulation and Order of Tentative Permanent Total 
Disability is ambiguous, the Court should allow for the submission of extrinsic 
evidence to evaluate the intent of the stipulation. This should include admission 
of the attached documents, Attachment A - Affidavit of Mark D. Dean; Attachment 
B - Affidavit of Timothy Allen. Mark D. Dean is the attorney for Larson / Globe 
Indemnity and represented this party at the timo Stipulation and Order of 
Tentative Permanent Total Disability was drafted, pigned on their behalf and 
attended the hearing on January 29, 2007. 
Attorney Dean indicates in his affidavit that ithe intent of the parties in 
entering into this agreement was to provide benefits to Ms. Hutchison on a 
temporary basis pending review by the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation. ERF 
and Larson/ Globe did not want to leave Ms. Hutchison in a suspended state 
without any medical and indemnity coverage during the evaluation by 
rehabilitation. Hence, the agreement was intended to allow her for short term 
medical and indemnity coverage pending that evaluation. 
Likewise, Attorney Timothy Allen was an attorney for one of the parties to 
this agreement (for Ms. Hutchison) and the draftor of the Stipulation and Order of 
Tentative Permanent Total Disability. He confirms that the provisions regarding 
the payment of medical expenses were to be made oh a short-term basis until Ms. 
Hutchison was reviewed by the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation. According to 
each of these attorneys, there was never any intention that by entering into this 
agreement Larsen / Globe was waiving their right t<£> application of section 35-1-
69, Utah Code. 
5 
as an administrative agency since the Commission clearly has no 
authority reform a contract or a make a new contract to conform with the 
intent of the parties . See Continental Casualty v. Industrial 
Commission. 61 Utah 16, 210 P. 127 (Utah 1922); See Empey v. 
Industrial Commission, 63 P.2d 530 (Utah 1937) (holding Commission is 
not vested with power to reform a contract or make a new contract to 
conform with the intent of the parties). 
Point 2: Larson's Right to Reimbursement of Indemnity 
Compensation Was Completely Overlooked by Both the 
ALJ and the Commission in their Orders 
The Employer's Reinsurance Fund argues that the issue raised 
regarding the adequacy of the Commission and ALJ's findings is 
improperly raised. Certainly, Larson has not had the opportunity to 
challenge the Commission's ruling until this juncture. Accordingly, there 
is no basis in arguing that it is improperly raised for the first time in this 
appeal with regard to the Commission's ruling. With regard to the ALJ's 
ruling, this issue was clearly raised in the Larson's Motion for Review in 
submitting argument that the ALJ erred in refusing to limit Larson / 
Globe's indemnity liability to 156 weeks as provided for under section 35-
1-69, Utah Code. (R., 118-120). On this basis, this issue was properly 
raised. 
6 
It is also evident that the both the ALJ and Commission's factual 
findings regarding reimbursement of indemnity compensation are 
inadequate. Utah law requires that an agency m&ke adequate factual 
findings. See Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Failure to do so is prejudicial to the appealing party and will 
require remand unless doing so is harmless. Se^ LaSal Oil v. 
Department of Environmental Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). Here, the failure to do so is prejudicial since reimbursement 
would be allowed under Utah law since Larson / Globe have paid over 
156 weeks of indemnity compensation and are entitled to reimbursement 
under statute. 
Both the ALJ and the Commission fail to address Larson's 
maximum liability of indemnity compensation of] 156 weeks under Utah 
statute and their right to reimbursement of indehmity compensation 
from the ERF which was an issue raised throughout the proceedings, 
including the January 29, 2007 hearing (where J£RF counsel failed to 
attend despite proper notice) and in pre-trial disclosures. Indeed, both 
the ALJ and Commission's orders focus on the rtight to medical expense 
reimbursement but are both completely silent oji Larson's liability for 
indemnity compensation. Both orders focus solely on the right of 
reimbursement for medical expenses based upoji the Stipulation and 
7 
Order of Tentative Permanent Total Disability . Given this error, the 
Order must be remanded for adequate review and findings regarding 
Larsons' liability for indemnity compensation and reimbursement of 
indemnity compensation under Utah statute. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Commission's Order and 
remand this case for further findings. 
Respectfully submitted this , ^ 4 ^ day of September, 2010. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
U^J /iL 
[ark D. Dean 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for appellants 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MARK D. 
DEAN 
Case No. 04-0636 
Judge Richard M. LaJeunesse 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SAlT LAKE ) 
My name is Mark D. Dean. I am a person over 18 years old and a resident of the 
State of UTAH. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein, am 
competent to testify thereto, and if called upon would so testify. Being first duly 
Attachment A 
Affidavit of Mark D. Dean 
2 
sworn on oath, I state as follows: 
2. I am an attorney at the law firm of Blackburn & Stoll, LC. 
3. This file was previously handled by Attorney Henry K. Chai II in our office on 
behalf of Larsen Beverage and Globe Indemnity Company. This file remained 
inactive until early 2004 until I was contacted by the claims adjustor who asked me 
to evaluate this case and to evaluate future medica] costs. 
4. Following this, I reviewed this file including amounts paid to date at that time. 
Upon my review I discovered that this was a claim in which certain statutory 
provisions would likely allow my client to obtain reimbursement of both medical 
and indemnity compensation since Ms. Hutchison was a likely candidate for 
permanent total disability compensation. At that time I notice that over 156 weeks 
of indemnity compensation had been paid and significant amounts in medical 
expenses. If the applicant was declared by a judge permanently and totally 
disabled, my client would be permitted to obtain reimbursement of both medical 
and indemnity benefits from the Employer's Reinsurance Fund under Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-69 and be liable for only 50% of future medical benefits. 
5. Under my calculations, assuming that Ms. Hutchison were declared permanent 
totally disabled, my client's right to reimbursement for payments made up through 
2004 could be as much as $32,902.12 in indemnity benefits and $265,832 in 
medical expenses plus reimbursement of 50% of any future medical expenses paid 
under the applicable Utah statute. 
6. I then contacted the claims adjustor at that time to inquire as to the claimant's 
current work status. I was told that she was not working and unable to work and 
that the Globe Indemnity was paying medical expenses for continued treatment of 
injuries from the claimed industrial accident. 
7. Given the significant opportunity to obtain reimbursement, and the claimant's 
current inability to work from this accident, (a factor necessary to establish a claim 
for permanent total disability), I told the adjustor that we should encourage Ms. 
Hutchison to file a claim for permanent total disability. By filing such a claim Ms. 
Hutchison would obtain lifetime indemnity compensation, the liability of which 
after the first 156 weeks would be the responsibility of the Employer's 
Reinsurance Fund. The adjustor agreed with my logic. 
8. In 2004 1 contacted Ms. Hutchison and informed her of her ability to obtain 
Affidavit of Mark D Dean 
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lifetime permanent total disability benefits. I informed her of her right to speak 
with an attorney and gave her the contact information of Attorney Timothy Allen, 
a competent and well respected applicant's attorney. Attorney Allen was also a 
former Administrative Law Judge at the Utah Labor Commission who is very 
knowledgeable in handling cases where the old 199^ law applies. I explained the 
current case posture to Attorney Allen. He agreed that given the claimant's 
impairment from the industrial accident, pre-existing impairments, and current 
inability to work due to this accident, Ms. Hutchisoh had a very strong case for 
pennanent total disability. Attorney Allen seemingly recognized that my client's 
ability to obtain reimbursement was continent upon his client successfully 
obtaining an order of permanent total disability for this accident. 
9. On July 2, 2004 Petitioner, through her counsel, Timothy Allen, filed an 
Application for Hearing seeking entitlement to permanent total disability and a 
claim for recommended medical care. 
10. On August 11, 2004 I filed an Answer on behalf of itay client admitting that Ms. 
Hutchison was permanently and totally disabled under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(1993) and submitted that reimbursements of medical expenses and indemnity 
compensation from the Employer's Reinsurance Fund was appropriate under Utah 
law. The Employer's Reinsurance Fund was joined in that case and filed an 
Answer. In my Answer I reserved the defenses und^r Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 
and indicated that appropriate reimbursements would be sought. 
11. The parties, which included myself, Ms. Hutchison, Timothy Allen and 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund counsel, Elliott Lawrence, met on March 30, 2005 
in a Labor Commission sponsored Mediation attempting to negotiate settlement 
prior proceeding on to an evidentiary hearing at the Labor Commission. At the 
mediation, I argued that Ms Hutchison had a 10% whole person permanent partial 
impairment from a low back surgery in 1986. Agaiji, it was my position that 
Larsen/Globe (as the employer and carrier for the claimed industrial accident) was 
seeking reimbursement and contribution by the Employer's Reinsurance Fund due 
to the application of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 and [35-1-69 (1993). However, no 
final settlement agreement was reached by the partiqs at the March 30, 2005 
mediation. 
12. Rather than leave Danna Hutchison in a suspended 
the worker's compensation litigation process (which 
Utah State Office of Vocational Rehabilitation), the 
Stipulation and Order of Tentative Permanent Total 
sjtate without benefits during 
included evaluation by the 
parties entered into a 
pisability. It was the intent of 
Affidavit of Mark D Dean 
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this agreement that the Employers Reinsurance Fund would pay permanent total 
disability benefits and the Larsen would continue to pay medical benefits on a 
tentative basis - meaning only until such time that the matter of permanent total 
disability benefits and reimbursement could be determined by the hearing process 
by an Administrative Law Judge. This document was drafted by Petitioner's 
attorney Timothy Allen, including the Order page, and signed by him. This 
agreement was signed by me on behalf of my client and also Elliott Lawrence on 
behalf of the Employer's Reinsurance Fund. 
13. While the Stipulated section of the agreement indicates that Larsen /Globe is 
responsible for "all medical expenses", this provision was intended by all parties to 
last for a short duration, hence the term "tentative" in the caption of the agreement, 
until she was evaluated by the Utah State office of Vocational Rehabilitation 
which would evaluate and let the ALJ know if she was retrainable. After this 
evaluation, the parties', including myself understood that per the statute that the 
judge would hold a hearing and evaluate whether Ms. Hutchison established the 
elements necessary to establish a claim for permanent total disability. 
14. Despite the fact that the medical expense provision noted above was not recited by 
the ALJ in the Stipulated Order page, Larsen has continued to pay ongoing 
medical expenses for this accident through the present time. 
15. The Stipulation and Tentative Order did not address the issue of reimbursement of 
medical expenses to Larsen since it was only intended as a tentative order. 
However, it was clear that at the time of the agreement, Larsen/Globe had no 
intention of waiving this significant benefit; in fact, it would make no sense to do 
so. 
16. On September 25, 2006, Ms. Hutchison filed an Evaluation Report from Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation. Following this on October 5, 2006, the Labor 
Commission set a hearing for January 26, 2007 to consider the Opinion of the 
Utah State Office of Rehabilitation Pursuant to Utah Code Section 35-l-67(5)(6). 
17. On December 15, 2006,1 filed Pre-Trial Disclosures for Larsen/Globe again 
asserting that Larsen Beverage and/or Globe Indemnity Co. did not dispute that 
Petitioner was permanent total disabled but rather, Ms. Hutchison had a 10% pre-
existing condition prior to the August 25,1993, which was agreed upon by all 
parties, pursuant to the Stipulation and Order of Tentative Permanent and Total 
Disability. In this document I specifically requested that the ALJ apply the 
Affidavit of Mark D Dean 
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specific statutory provisions which limit liability to l|56 weeks for indemnity 
compensation and reimbursement of 50% of all excess past and future medical 
expenses from the Employer's Reinsurance Fund over the first $20,000. 
18. Upon review of the records I have no evidence that $RF filed any Pre-Trial 
Disclosures. 
19. Upon checking out the appellate Record on January 18, 2010 for completion of the 
Docketing Statement, I discovered that the Pre-Trial disclosure form filed by 
Larsen was not contained in the Record, although proof of service is contained in 
Larsen's attorneys file and conversations with the Commission show that it was 
entered in their system. This was since corrected on appeal upon motion of 
Larsen. 
20. A hearing was later held on January 29, 2007 before Judge Richard LaJeunesse 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(5). Those present at the hearing included 
myself and Ms. Hutchison. ERFs new counsel and attorney Allen did not attend. 
At the hearing before Judge LaJeunesse, I did not contest that Ms. Hutchison is 
permanent and totally disabled. I argued that the ALJ should apply the statutory 
provisions of 35-1-67 and 35-1-69 which allow for 156 weeks of compensation 
and medical reimbursement if the injured worker has at least a 10% pre-existing 
condition for any cause or origin which was well documented in the medical 
records. There was no disagreement from Danna Hutchison nor the Employer's 
Reinsurance Fund. 
21. At the hearing, I stated: 
MR. DEAN: Your Honor, in this case, the respondents [Larsen] have paid 
benefits out to-date, for indemnity benefits we have paid $70,045. The 
compensation rate was stipulated to be $227 per week. In addition, to-date 
Globe Indemnity has paid $825,667.39 in medical benefits. Pursuant to our 
prior stipulation, the parties agreed that Ms. Hutchison was permanently 
and totally disabled pending referral to the state office of vocation 
rehabilitation. It's my understanding that she was cooperative with their 
efforts, that they have come back and said that they felt that she was not a 
candidate for rehabilitation at this time. It may be noted, previously she had 
gone through the state voc. rehab and attempted rehabilitation, but was 
unsuccessful. At this point itfs our position that we don't contest the 
perm total disability status of Ms. Hutchison, anc^  believe the benefits 
should be continued as they have been to-date. On behalf of Globe 
Affidavit of Mark D Dean 
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Indemnity, we will be submitting for reimbursement of all benefits, 
medical benefits after the first 50 percent of medical benefits after the 
$20,000, and reimbursement of indemnity benefits after the first 156 
weeks pursuant to the Utah Code. One other thing, Your Honor, and I 
know this can be a sticking point sometimes. But in this instance, we have 
tried to mediate this case; it was unsuccessful. We are also seeking 
interest along with the other reimbursements that we're seeking. 
22. The Court responded to me that they would "order appropriate reimbursement 
under the statute." 
23. On April 24, 2007 ALJ LaJeunesse entered a Final Order of Permanent Total 
Disability (the "ALJ's Order"). Contrary to judge LaJeunesse's bench ruling at 
hearing and statements to me at hearing, Judge LaJeunesse concluded that Larsen 
was responsible for all medical expenses reasonably related to Danna Hutchison 
for her medical problems caused by the August 23, 1993 industrial accident. 
Contrary to the oral bench ruling at hearing, ALJ LaJeunesse's Order did not 
apply the statutory provision of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 which allow for 156 
weeks of compensation only and medical reimbursement of past and future 
medicals from the Employer's Reinsurance Fund when there is found to be a 10% 
pre-existing impairment prior to the industrial accident as he indicated he would at 
the hearing. It is my believe that the ALJ incorrectly modified Stipulation and 
Order of Tentative Permanent Total Disability without any authority by the parties' 
to that agreement. 
24. Given the error made by the ALJ I filed several motions. On May 9, 2007 I filed a 
Motion for Relief from Order and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
25. Since the motion was not timely ruled upon, on May 22, 2007,1 filed a Motion for 
Review of the ALJ's Final Order of Permanent Total Disability. In the Motion for 
Review I argued that the Stipulation and Tentative Order for Permanent Total 
Disability approved by Judge George on April 29, 2005, was considered by the 
parties as a tentative agreement between the parties to ensure that Danna 
Hutchison received permanent total disability benefits and medical benefits as the 
parties moved forward with the litigation process. I argued that they had paid 
more than 312 weeks of disability benefits prior to the initiation of Ms. 
Hutchison's litigation for permanent total disability, well above the amount 
required by law if one has a 10% permanent partial disability prior to an industrial 
accident. In addition, I argued that my client has paid well over $825,000 in 
medical benefits and should be entitled to statutory reimbursement under Utah 
Affidavit of Mark D Dean 
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Code Ann. §35-1-69. 
26. The Commission interpreted the Stipulation and Tentative Order for Permanent 
Total Disability and ruled that medical expenses are | not reimbursable and in fact, 
failed to make any ruling regarding reimbursement of indemnity compensation. I 
believe that this ruling oversteps the intent of the patties and is absolutely contrary 
to the purpose of that agreement. 
DATED this ( ^ clay of September, 2010. 
teji. 
Mark D. pean 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this ^'4- day of September, 2010. 
flGfobn ' 743)0 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public A A A 
Residing in: TAQUuL ( W l f y l/foh 
Notary Public*" mm *• 
D£NIS£N.PANH0RST I 
257 East 200 South Suite 800 
Salt> lake City Utah 84 m | 
My Commission Expires -
jOctober 1,2010 | 
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1. My name is Timothy Allen. I am a person over 18 years old and a resident of the 
State of UTAH. I have personal knowledge of the niatters stated herein, am 
competent to testify thereto, and if called upon would so testify. Being first duly 
Attachment B 
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sworn on oath, I state as follows: 
2. I am an attorney at the law firm of Timothy C. Allen. 
3. I was contacted in 2004 by Attorney Mark Dean who suggested that I speak with 
Ms. Danna Hutchison regarding her worker's compensation claim of August 23, 
1993 where she was lifting a fountain drink machine and sustained injuries to her 
low back. Attorney Dean explained to me that Ms. Hutchison may have a claim 
for permanent total disability and that if she did, his client, Larsen Beverage and/or 
Globe Indemnity would have a claim for reimbursement of medical and indemnity 
compensation. 
4. I had a discussion with my client and determined that a case for permanent total 
disability was very strong. 
5. Following my discussion with Ms. Hutchison, I filed an Application for Hearing 
on July 2, 2004 seeking recommended medical care and permanent total disability 
for the August 23, 1993 industrial accident. 
6. A hearing on this matter was set before Judge Donald George on March 23, 2005 
but was cancelled. 
7. On March 30, 2005, the parties, which included myself, Ms. Hutchison, Mark 
Dean and Employer's Reinsurance Fund counsel, Elliott Lawrence met in a Labor 
Commission sponsored Mediation attempting to negotiate settlement prior 
proceeding on to an evidentiary hearing at the Labor Commission. At the 
mediation, Mr. Dean argued that Ms Hutchison had a 10% whole person 
permanent partial impairment from a low back surgery in 1986. It was his client's 
position that that Ms. Hutchison was permanently and totally disabled and that 
reimbursement and contribution by the Employer's Reinsurance Fund was 
applicable due to the application of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 and 35-1-69 (1993). 
Unfortunately, no final settlement agreement was reached by the parties at the 
March 30, 2005 mediation, because the ERF was not willing to waive referral to 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services. 
8. The parties did not want to leave Danna Hutchison in a suspended state without 
benefits during the worker's compensation litigation process (which included 
evaluation by the Utah State Office of Vocational Rehabilitation). Accordingly, 
the parties entered into a Stipulation and Order of Tentative Permanent Total 
Disability which was signed on April 29, 2005. This agreement was signed by me, 
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on behalf of my client, Mark D. Dean for Larsen / Gl^be and Elliott Lawrence for 
the Employer's Reinsurance Fund. There is no doubt that it was the intent of this 
agreement that the Employers Reinsurance Fund would pay permanent total 
disability benefits and the Larsen would continue to pay medical benefits on a 
provisional basis only until such time that the matter of permanent total disability 
benefits and reimbursement could be determined by the hearing process by an 
Administrative Law Judge. This document was drafted by me. 
9. The Stipulated section of the agreement indicates that Larsen /Globe is responsible 
for "all medical expenses". When the parties negotiated this provision it was 
intended by all parties that the benefits, including medicals, were not to last on a 
permanent basis, hence the term "tentative" in the cabtion of the agreement. They 
were intended to be paid until she was evaluated by tpe Utah State office of 
Vocational Rehabilitation which would evaluate and let the ALJ know if she was 
retrainable. After this evaluation, the parties', including myself understood that 
per the statute that the judge would hold a hearing and evaluate whether Ms. 
Hutchison established the elements necessary to establish a claim for permanent 
total disability. 
10. Despite the fact that the medical expense provision rioted above was not recited by 
the ALJ in the Stipulated Order page, Larsen has kindly continued to pay ongoing 
medical expenses for this accident through the present time. 
11. The Stipulation and Order of Tentative Permanent Tbtal Disability did not address 
the issue of reimbursement of medical expenses to Larsen since it was only 
intended as a tentative order. There was no reason tp address reimbursement at 
that time given the nature of the agreement. It was cjlear to me that at the time of 
the agreement, Larsen/Globe had no intention of waiving their right to 
reimbursement and, in fact, it would make no sense for them to do so. 
12. A hearing was later held on January 29, 2007 before) Judge Richard LaJeunesse 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(5) to consider the opinion of the Utah State 
Office of Rehabilitation. Those present at the hearing included Ms. Hutchison. I 
did not attend this hearing because vocational rehabilitation found that she was not 
retrainable. On this basis, the ALJ was mandated by statute to award permanent 
total disability compensation. 
13. When I received the April 24, 2007 Final Order of Permanent Total Disability I 
was perplexed by the ALJ's ruling since the parties did not agree to modify the 
Stipulation to reflect a permanent order. I was also surprised that the judge failed 
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to apply the appropriate reimbursement provisions under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
69. I believe that the ALJ's Order and Commission's adoption of it oversteps the 
intent of the parties and is contrary to the purpose of the Stipulation and Order of 
Tentative Permanent Total Disability. 
tt DATED this 10 day of September, 2010. _ 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this ID day of September, 2010. 
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